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UNEXPECTED CONTROL STRUCTURE INTERACTION ON INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 
 
On June 23, 2011, the International Space Station (ISS) was performing a routine 180 degree yaw maneuver in 
support of a Russian vehicle docking when the on board Russian Segment (RS) software unexpectedly declared 
two attitude thrusters failed and switched thruster configurations in response to unanticipated ISS dynamic 
motion.  Flight data analysis after the maneuver indicated that higher than predicted structural loads had been 
induced at various locations on the United States (U.S.) segment of the ISS.  Further analysis revealed that the 
attitude control system was firing thrusters in response to both structural flex and rigid body rates, which 
resonated the structure and caused high loads and fatigue cycles.  It was later determined that the thruster 
themselves were healthy. The RS software logic, which was intended to react to thruster failures, had instead 
been heavily influenced by interaction between the control system and structural flex.   
This paper will discuss the technical aspects of the control structure interaction problem that led to the RS 
control system firing thrusters in response to structural flex, the factors that led to insufficient preflight analysis 
of the thruster firings, and the ramifications the event had on the ISS.  An immediate consequence included 
limiting which thrusters could be used for attitude control. This complicated the planning of on-orbit thruster 
events and necessitated the use of suboptimal thruster configurations that increased propellant usage and caused 
thruster lifetime usage concerns.  In addition to the technical aspects of the problem, the team dynamics and 
communication shortcomings that led to such an event happening in an environment where extensive analysis is 
performed in support of human space flight will also be examined.   Finally, the technical solution will be 
presented, which required a multidisciplinary effort between the U.S. and Russian control system engineers and 
loads and dynamics structural engineers to develop and implement an extensive modification in the RS software 
logic for ISS attitude control thruster firings. 
 
 
  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170006953 2019-08-31T06:37:57+00:00Z
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THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Space Station (ISS) is a highly 
complex ~450,000 kg laboratory in low Earth orbit.  It 
consists of solar arrays, radiators, and a main truss 
that supports these components and pressurized 
modules.  Other components include robotic arms, 
docked crew vehicles, berthed cargo vehicles, and 
external stowage pallets.  Several of these 
components are highlighted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 – International Space Station in 2011 
  
The control system for ISS is shared between the 
U.S. and Russian segments.  The Russian Segment 
(RS) provides thruster control for maneuvering to 
and holding attitudes required for a variety of on-
orbit events, including cargo and crew vehicle 
approach and departure.  The U.S. segment attitude 
control is responsible for non-propulsive attitude 
control, which is used during quiescent, non-
maneuvering, operations.  
 
 
JUNE 23, 2011 
 
THE MANEUVER 
On June 23, 2011 (Day 174/2011), the ISS was 
performing a routine 180-degree maneuver to the 
docking attitude of the 43P Progress cargo vehicle 
using RS thrusters.  Service Module thrusters were 
used for pitch and yaw control, and Progress on DC1 
nadir thrusters were used for roll control, as depicted 
in Figure 2.  The thrusters and vectors are shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 2 – ISS Thruster Configuration for Day 174 
 
 
Figure 3 – Thruster Configuration for Maneuver 
 
During the maneuver, the RS software declared 
certain thrusters failed and switched to alternate 
thrusters.  This was not typical behavior.  
Nevertheless, the maneuver did complete as 
planned, achieving the desired 180 degree yaw. 
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This maneuver resonated the structure, causing 
high loads and fatigue cycles.  The event was clearly 
visible in ISS sensor data.  As an example, the 
accelerations measured by the Space Acceleration 
Measure System (SAMS) accelerometer sensor in the 
Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) are shown in 
Figure 4.  The location of this sensor on the ISS is 
denoted in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Acceleration Measured at JEM 
 
 
Figure 5 – ISS Sensor Locations 
 
The region of high acceleration, which lasted for 
over 10 minutes, was not predicted by pre-flight 
analysis. A review of historical on-orbit SAMS 
accelerometer data later showed that this was not 
the first time that this type of structural response 
had occurred.  High acceleration events had 
occurred during at least a dozen large Russian 
maneuvers since December of 2009.  The June 23, 
2011 event was the most severe.  It demonstrated 
that the structural risks due to ISS thruster firings 
were higher than previously believed.   
 
    
RS THRUSTER FIRING CONSTRAINT LOGIC  
The RS software logic that controlled thruster on 
times during this maneuver implemented a delay 
time structure.  The thrusters could fire for as long as 
needed, but once they turned off, there was a 
minimum delay required before they would be 
allowed to fire again.  The minimum delay times 
were set to 3-1-1 seconds (roll-pitch-yaw).  The 
controller logic provided no limit on thruster on-
times and no limit on firing repetitions.   
This 3-1-1 minimum delay time control system 
logic was not new to space stations.  Not only had it 
been in use since the beginning of the ISS, it had been 
used for the Russian MIR Station as well.  There had 
been no demonstrated issues with the control 
methodology until Day 174.   
 
 
RS THRUSTER FAILURE DETECTION LOGIC 
RS software has logic to monitor the expected 
attitude rates following each thruster firing 
compared to the measured attitude rates.  If the 
difference between the expected and measured 
rates exceeds a threshold, the software declares 
thrusters failed and reconfigures to use alternate 
thrusters.  The Russian rate sensor is located in the 
Service Module.  During this particular yaw 
maneuver, RS software declared two SM positive 
yaw thrusters on manifold 2 (thrusters #18 and #19) 
failed. The SM controller automatically switched 
over to the redundant positive yaw thrusters on 
backup manifold 1 (#12 and #13) and completed the 
maneuver and docking operations.  The thrust 
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vectors are shown in Figure 3
. 
Several days after the maneuver, the thrusters 
were tested and determined to be healthy.  This 
indicated that the declaration of the yaw thrusters as 
failed was due to yaw rates measured by the rate 
sensor not comparing well to expected rates.  The 
rate sensor itself was healthy, meaning that the rates 
it was sensing were real rates. The ISS had 
experienced notable flex dynamics in addition to the 
rigid body dynamics inherent to the maneuver. 
Figure 6 shows the unfiltered rates as measured 
by the Russian rate sensor in the SM.  Notice that the 
rates measured for the yaw axis were much larger 
and noisier than roll and pitch rates.   
 
Figure 6 – Measured Rate on RS in deg/sec 
 
USE OF ON-ORBIT ACCELERATION DATA 
The high acceleration levels during the maneuver 
were captured by both of the continuous 
acceleration data streaming systems on ISS: the 
Space Acceleration Measure System (SAMS) and the 
Microgravity Acceleration Measurement System 
(MAMS).  These systems collect data continuously at 
multiple sensor locations in the pressurized modules.  
The locations are shown in Figure 5.  The resonant 
event was clearly visible on all of the SAMS and 
MAMS on-orbit accelerometers.  Figure 7 shows the 
accelerations measured in the JEM during the Day 
174 event.  The long bright red signature towards the 
bottom center of the figure indicates that high 
accelerations were detected for a prolonged period 
of time at very low frequencies.   
 
 
Figure 7 – Power Spectral Density (PSD) Spectrogram 
using SAMS Sensor in JEM 
 
The Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the on-orbit 
accelerations in the JEM during the resonant period 
showed that the structural frequency excitation was 
greatest at 0.12 and 0.272 Hz, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 – PSD of Structural Frequency Excitation using 
SAMS Data 
 
Measured on-orbit data from the SAMS 
accelerometers was critical to the investigation and 
reconstruction of the event.  The data showed that 
the frequency content of the ISS response was at the 
same frequency as two predicted global ISS modes of 
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0.27 Hz and 0.12 Hz on the day of the event, which 
elevated the rates and structural loads.  The SAMS 
data allowed the Loads & Dynamics (L&D) team to 
correlate the analytical event reconstruction to on-
orbit measurements.  
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THRUSTER FIRING DATA 
On July 29, 2011, the Russian Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control (GNC) team provided the as-
flown jet firing history for the June 23, 2011 event to 
the U.S. teams.  The PSD of the as-flown jet firing 
history during the resonance is shown in Figure 9.   
 
 
Figure 9 – PSD of As-Flown Jet Firings 
The U.S. L&D team used this data to reconstruct 
the structural loads on ISS by applying the thruster 
force time histories to a structural finite element 
model of the ISS configuration at the time of the 
event.  The model used for the reconstruction had a 
first global mode at 0.1216 Hz and another key mode 
at 0.2760 Hz.  Modal damping of 1% was applied to 
all modes. 
The analytical accelerations calculated using the 
as-flown jet firing history matched on-orbit SAMS 
acceleration data very well.  PSD plots of the 
excitation in the JEM during the maneuver, both 
analytical and measured, are shown in Figure 10. 
 
  
Figure 10 – PSD of JEM SAMS Data Compared to 
Reconstructed Data 
 
Good correlation between the measured and 
analytical reconstructed acceleration time histories 
was observed.  This demonstrated that the analytical 
structural finite element model of the ISS 
represented the on-orbit ISS configuration well.  The 
good correlation between the as-flown 
reconstruction and the measured SAMS 
accelerometer data from the JEM was clearly 
illustrated early on in the excitation for the ISS Y-
direction, as shown in Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11 – On Orbit vs. Reconstruction of ISS Y 
Acceleration 
A very good frequency match was observed 
midway through the excitation period as well, as 
shown in Figure 12.   
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Figure 12 – On Orbit vs. Reconstruction of ISS Y 
Acceleration 
The resonance started to deconstruct before the 
thruster failure annunciated, as shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 – On Orbit vs. Reconstruction of ISS Y 
Acceleration 
 
U.S. GNC SIMULATIONS 
The U.S. GNC team analyzed the on orbit thruster 
firing data and compared it to their U.S. simulations 
of the RS GNC system.  Simulations were performed 
with both rigid model representations of the ISS 
structure and ISS flexible structural models that 
contained information regarding the ISS structural 
mode shapes and frequencies.   These flex models 
were provided to the U.S. GNC team by the U.S. L&D 
team.   
The U.S. GNC team provided its first simulation of 
the event to the U.S. L&D team on August 15, 2011.  
Unlike the as-flown jet firing analysis, analytical 
accelerations derived from the U.S. GNC thruster 
firing simulation of the maneuver did not match the 
measured on-orbit accelerations well.  The 
simulation did not capture the observed resonance 
sufficiently for the loads analysis.  Thus, the loads 
were being under-predicted.  Furthermore, the loads 
previously calculated pre-flight using U.S. GNC inputs 
did not envelope this on-orbit event.  
Enveloped loads from the new GNC simulations 
set of 97 (96 flex, 1 rigid) cases that were generated 
a month later (September 19, 2011) better matched 
the peak loads for Day 174.  Even so, only one of the 
97 cases resulted in similar load levels.   These new 
GNC simulations also corrected an error in the 
previous GNC simulations that had held roll and pitch 
near zero for the yaw maneuver, when in fact the RS 
logic on orbit allowed roll and yaw to vary.  This will 
be discussed further in a later section.  
Figure 14 shows the yaw firing PSD functions for 
the flight data, a rigid simulation, and one of the 96 
flex simulations.   
 
 
Figure 14 – Flight Data Yaw Thruster Firing PSD 
Compared to Rigid and Flex Simulation Data 
 
Notice that only the flex simulation recreates the 
thruster firings at the 0.12 Hz frequency while the 
rigid simulation does not, suggesting that the 0.12 Hz 
yaw firings were largely in response to structural flex 
dynamics, not rigid body dynamics.  This means that 
the 0.12 Hz yaw firings were largely in response to 
the dynamic flex motion of the ISS.  In contrast, the 
0.27 Hz frequency content in the yaw firings is in 
both the flight data and the rigid body simulation 
data, indicating that the 0.27 Hz yaw firings were 
largely in response to rigid body dynamics. 
Figure 15 shows the PSDs for the roll thruster 
firings.  Like the yaw firings, the 0.27 Hz frequency 
firings are in the flight data and the rigid simulation 
data.  Since these firings are present in the rigid body 
simulation, they are largely due to rigid body 
dynamics. 
Yaw Thruster 
Switching 
7 
 
 
 
Figure 15 – Flight Data Roll Thruster Firing PSD 
Compared to Rigid and Flex Simulation Data 
 
Figure 16 shows the co-plot of the PSDs of the 
Russian Segment unfiltered yaw rate, on orbit yaw 
jet firings, and the accelerations in the ISS Y-direction 
as measured by SAMS accelerometer in the JEM 
(121f05).  The plot is scaled to focus on the time 
period when the resonance occurred, which was the 
time period from 13:40 to 13:50.  Notice that the rate 
sensor data, thruster firing data, and accelerometer 
data are well aligned for the 0.12 Hz yaw firings as 
well as the 0.27 Hz firings.  Notice that there are also 
firings at 0.14-0.16 Hz, but that the rate sensor and 
accelerometer data do not align well with those 
firings.  There are rigid body yaw firings at 0.14 Hz 
from Figure 14, but without a structural mode at 0.14 
Hz, the structure, rate sensor, and thruster firings do 
not sync well with each other.  
 
 
Figure 16 – Co-plot of PSD of Yaw Thruster Firings, Yaw 
Rate, and Accelerometer Data from 121f05 
 
 
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF DAY 174 EVENT 
The L&D analysis showed that the ISS response 
and high structural loads were predominantly driven 
by the SM yaw firings.  The load levels dropped by 
only 10% when all of the roll firings were removed 
from the as-flown reconstruction analysis.    
Yaw firings in the as-flown jet firing histories 
occurred in “clusters” of one to four relatively small 
pulse width firings near the minimum delay time.  
These clusters occurred every 8 to 9 seconds, which 
is equivalent to a single 1.2 second firing every 8 to 9 
seconds, or approximately 0.12 Hz.   This resulted in 
the sustained excitation of the 0.12 Hz ISS structural 
mode.  The clusters are visible in Figure 17.  Note that 
the start of each cluster is generally aligned with the 
peak response of the Module to Truss Structure 
(MTS) Strut #2 axial load, a key structural location on 
the ISS. 
 
 
Figure 17 – Co-plot of Thruster Firings and MTS Strut 
#2 Axial Load during 0.12 Hz Excitation 
 
This type of resonance was not reflected in the 
pre-flight attitude control loads analysis performed 
by the U.S. L&D team.  As a result, the Day 174 loads 
on orbit were often 25% higher than existing pre-
flight attitude control loads.   
The first global ISS mode was a twisting mode of 
the ISS truss relative to the pressurized modules, as 
shown in Figure 18.  The motion is predominantly in 
the ISS X-Y plane.  It has been referred to as “the 
scissor mode”, as the truss and pressurized modules 
pivot with respect to one another about a central 
connection point, like a pair of scissors.  This mode 
can be easily excited by the SM yaw thrusters, which 
fire almost entirely in the ISS-Y direction.   For the ISS 
configuration at the time of the event, the modal 
frequency of this first global mode was 0.12 Hz.   
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Figure 18 – 0.12 Hz Global ISS Mode  
 
Excitation of the 0.12 Hz mode results in 
increased loading on the 10 MTS struts, which are 
the structural elements that connect the pressurized 
modules to the truss segment at the “scissor” pivot 
point.  The locations of the MTS struts are shown in 
Figure 19 and Figure 20.   
 
 
Figure 19 – Attach Point for Pressurized Modules and 
Truss Segment (MTS Struts) 
 
 
Figure 20 – Schematic of MTS Struts Connecting S0 
Truss to Lab 
 
The induced loads in several MTS strut were 
higher than the pre-flight verification limit.  High 
loads of concern were calculated at several ISS 
locations, including the MTS struts, the Node1 to Lab 
interface, Thermal Radiator Rotary Joints (TRRJ), and 
truss interfaces.  The resonance of the 0.12 Hz mode 
was largely due to thruster firings in response to ISS 
structural flex.   
The 0.27 Hz global mode is characterized by a 
bending of the pressurized modules about the ISS-Z 
axis, as well as some motion of the main truss, as 
shown in Figure 21.  This mode can be easily excited 
by the SM yaw thrusters as well.  The resonance of 
the 0.27 Hz mode was primarily due to rigid body 
dynamics and not structural flex.  Although this 
mode resulted in loading of key primary interfaces 
and the MTS struts, the majority of the load was 
driven by the 0.12 Hz mode.   
 
 
Figure 21 – 0.27 Hz Global ISS Mode 
 
The delay time sweeps in Figure 22 illustrate the 
general ISS structural response to SM yaw thruster 
firings at varying frequencies.  The plot shows the 
peak load/limit ratio across the ISS verses frequency.   
 
 
Figure 22 – ISS Structural Sensitivity to Frequency of SM 
Yaw Thruster Firings 
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This data was generated with the SM yaw 
thrusters firing at duty cycles of 15% and 13%, which 
is close to the thruster firing duty cycle during the on-
orbit excitation period.    
When the yaw thrusters are fired at the duty cycle 
of Day 174 such that the frequency is 0.27 Hz, there 
is a peak, but it is below a ratio of 0.50.   
When the yaw thrusters are fired at the duty cycle 
of Day 174 such that the frequency is 0.12 Hz, there 
is a huge peak with a ratio between 1.5 and 2.0.   
It is clear that excitation of the 0.12 Hz mode by 
the yaw thrusters drives the loads much more than 
excitation of the 0.27 Hz mode. 
Even more concerning than the magnitude of the 
structural loads specifically on Day 174 was the fact 
that on-orbit loads due to thruster firings were not 
enveloped by the pre-flight analysis load predictions.  
The L&D team’s reconstruction of the Day 174 event 
showed that the on-orbit thruster firing patterns 
were different than what was being assumed in pre-
flight analysis.  The pre-flight analysis had been 
insufficient.  
 
 
IMMEDIATE EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS 
One of the immediate effects on operations was 
to limit the use of certain ISS thrusters.  Several 
months after Day 174, the ISS Program pushed to use 
SM thrusters for roll control rather than Progress 
thrusters based on recommendations from L&D.  The 
loads induced by SM roll thrusters were much less 
than the operationally preferred Progress roll 
thrusters.  However, using SM thrusters for roll had 
several disadvantages.  The SM roll thrusters don’t 
have the advantage of the moment arm that the 
Progress thrusters have, meaning that more 
propellant is used for an equivalent maneuver.  
Propellant on ISS is a precious resource, so the 
additional propellant use was an important impact.  
Additionally, some of the SM roll thrusters are 
getting close to their life expectancy with 77% of life 
used, and ISS is expected to continue to fly until 
2024.   
The use of thrusters on the visiting vehicles 
docked to SM aft was limited as well.  This included 
both the Progress mid-ring thrusters and the 
European Space Agency’s Automated Transfer 
Vehicle (ATV) thrusters.  Instead, the SM pitch and 
yaw thrusters were used for all RS thruster control 
events.  This constraint caused some issues for 
propellant management, but did not raise a thruster 
life concern.   
After it was confirmed that the pre-flight loads 
values were under predicting on-orbit loads, an 
additional 1.25 uncertainty factor was applied to 
existing loads to compensate for this under 
prediction.  This placed additional constraints on 
operations, including the allowed U.S. solar array 
positions during dynamic events, which had 
implications for power and timelines. 
 
 
PRE-FLIGHT ANALYSIS OF RS MIN DELAY 
LOGIC ON ISS 
 
TEAM ROLES 
The ISS constantly changes configurations.  Some 
of these changes are due to modules being added or 
moved, the arrival and departure of cargo and crew 
vehicles, the rotation of large joints that rotate solar 
arrays and radiators, and robotic activities.  In order 
to ensure mission success and safe on-orbit 
operations, both the GNC and L&D teams had been 
performing continuing and extensive analysis on 
each ISS configuration since the first assembly 
mission.   
The U.S. and Russian GNC teams both performed 
analysis of the RS thruster control system.  Rocket 
and Space Corporation Energia (RSC-E) was officially 
responsible for certification of the RS GNC system.  
The U.S. analysis of the RS thruster control was an 
independent assessment and provided inputs to the 
U.S. L&D team on how to model the RS control 
system in the structural analysis.  The U.S. GNC and 
RS GNC teams each used their own set of rigid body 
and structural flex models of the ISS in their analyses.  
However, the flex models used by U.S. GNC had the 
additional benefit of being correlated to on-orbit 
accelerometer data by the U.S. L&D team.  
 
 
ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES BEFORE THE  
DAY 174 EVENT 
During the ISS assembly phase, the U.S. GNC team 
produced a series of memos for the L&D team to 
document the RS control system thruster forcing 
function.  The descriptions of the attitude control 
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firings were updates of descriptions originally 
provided by the Russian specialists in the late 1990’s.  
Parameters included the range of possible thruster 
on-times and off-times.  The data was most 
applicable to routine and expected attitude control 
firings.  In addition to the memos, the U.S. GNC team 
provided U.S. L&D with approximately 50 jet firing 
histories per thruster configuration from rigid body 
simulations that were representative of various 
maneuvers the ISS could perform. 
The L&D team assessed RS thruster control in pre-
flight verification analysis using both synthetic and 
simulation-based forcing functions to calculate the 
peak loads on primary ISS structural interfaces and 
other key locations.  The very nature of the preflight 
analysis assumed that these calculated pre-flight 
peak loads would envelope any loads induced on-
orbit.  For each analysis cycle, L&D would build a 
series of 250 to 400 synthetic forcing function time 
histories of possible thruster firings based on the 
equations and parameters in the U.S. GNC memos.  
Per the preflight verification process, once it was 
confirmed for each flight that these peak loads were 
within hardware capability, the use of RS thruster 
control was approved, including maneuvers up to 0.1 
deg/sec rate and thruster firings due to a recovery 
from Loss of Attitude Control on-orbit.   
The Day 174 event loads were significantly higher 
than the predicted preflight loads, which 
demonstrated that the behavior of the on-orbit 
controller was not being captured by the L&D pre-
flight analysis.  
 
 
WORST CASE THRUSTER FIRING ASSUMPTIONS 
Prior to Day 174, the U.S. GNC team believed that 
the U.S. L&D team was independently evaluating 
worst case thruster firings at ISS structural mode 
frequencies.  Therefore, the U.S. GNC memos only 
documented what the U.S. GNC team thought the 
loads team needed, which was information 
regarding expected firings, and did not include any 
direction to perform a frequency sweep or resonant 
analysis.   
Early in the ISS program, the loads team did in fact 
analyze worst case thruster firings that were aligned 
with the ISS structural frequencies, but as the ISS 
grew and the frequencies of global modes 
decreased, worst case loads could no longer be 
cleared in pre-flight analysis.  It was believed that this 
analytical approach was extremely conservative and 
such firings would never occur on-orbit. Thus, the 
loads analyses of thruster attitude control was 
modified to focus on more realistic thruster firing 
patterns and use that data for preflight verification.   
This belief of extreme conservatism was largely 
based on statements made by the U.S. GNC team.  
Prior to the Day 174 maneuver, the U.S. GNC team 
produced analyses of RS thruster control with the 
conclusion stated as “there is no CSI.”  The U.S. GNC 
team meant that there was no CSI that caused 
controllability issues and that the maneuvers 
completed as desired without excessive propellant 
use.  However, the L&D team interpreted the 
statement “there is no CSI” as meaning that the 
thrusters would not fire repeatedly at a global ISS 
structural frequency such that the structure would 
be at risk.  To further solidify the L&D interpretation, 
GNC also stated that the worst case thruster firings 
for the structure would never happen.  
From the data and plots in this paper, it is clear 
that the thrusters could and did fire in response to 
flex and that ISS had experienced a control structure 
interaction problem that caused higher than 
expected loads.   
 
 
U.S. GNC SIMULATION LOGIC 
In addition to the communications issues 
between the U.S. GNC and L&D teams, the U.S. GNC 
simulation of the RS maneuver logic did not 
accurately reflect the roll and pitch deviations 
occurring during the Day 174 on-orbit maneuver.  
The original U.S. GNC simulation of the RS controller 
held the roll and pitch angles near zero degrees 
during the duration of the yaw maneuver, when in 
fact in the RS logic allowed the roll and pitch to vary, 
with roll and pitch both as large as approximately 20 
degrees during the maneuver, as shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23 – Roll, PItch, and Yaw during the June 23, 
2011 Maneuver 
 
When the ISS roll deviates from zero degrees to 
nearly 20 degrees, as allowed by the RS maneuver 
logic, a large gravity gradient torque is experienced 
by the ISS.  The 0.27 Hz roll firings were required on 
orbit due to the gravity gradient torque on the ISS.  
Because those firings are not exactly through the 
center of mass, there is coupling into the yaw 
channel such that yaw firings at 0.27 Hz were also 
required.  However, the 0.12 Hz yaw firings were 
largely the result of structural flex, not rigid body 
dynamics.   
The U.S. GNC had been comparing flight data to 
simulation data for reboosts, but not for maneuvers.  
After this event, U.S. GNC began comparing flight 
data to simulation data for maneuvers as well as 
reboosts to ensure that U.S. simulations were 
accurately modeling RS thruster firings. 
 
 
ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES AFTER THE  
DAY 174 EVENT 
Soon after the event, the U.S. GNC and U.S. L&D 
teams adopted new integrated analytical 
procedures.  First, a closed loop process to 
determine peak structural loads on ISS elements 
during RS control events was enacted with three 
basic phases:   
 
(1) L&D would provide an ISS dynamic 
models to U.S. GN&C 
(2) U.S. GNC would perform RS control 
system simulations and provide jet firing 
histories back to L&D  
(3) L&D would run the jet firing histories on 
the same model that was provided to 
GN&C   
 
Since the RS control system was responding to 
flex motion, the models needed to be the same at 
each step of the analysis cycle and have the same 
frequency content.   
Second, the number of simulations was 
increased.  Initially, the total number of cases being 
assessed was typically less than 100 cases per event.  
In March 2012, the teams suspected the data sets 
were not large enough to capture the variability 
inherent in these simulations and loads calculations.  
A nearly 2,000 case data set was developed to 
generate a more statistically meaningful set of loads 
responses for generic maneuvers.  A large number of 
thruster firing time histories are needed because the 
structural response is quite sensitive to even small 
changes in the spacing and duration of jet firings 
when the firing period is near a structural mode.  
Figure 24 shows the dynamic amplification factor 
(ratio of peak response of a harmonic input vs 
response of a static input of same amplitude) for a 
1% damped system.  For “large” data sets of 
maneuvers, the peak loads showed exceedances of 
structural design limits on some interfaces for 
Progress roll control, which resulted in the 
operations restriction on Progress roll usage pending 
event-specific analysis, as mentioned earlier. 
 
 
Figure 24  – Illustration of Dynamic Amplification 
Factor 
 
Third, all of the simulations that were produced 
after Day 174 used the ISS flex models instead of ISS 
rigid body models.  This was necessary for GNC to 
capture the full on-orbit behavior. 
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In the year after the event, the U.S. GNC and U.S. 
L&D teams worked closely to determine what 
products were needed from the U.S. GNC team to 
define RS thruster control.  U.S. GNC produced even 
more flex simulation data for the L&D team to 
analyze for various maneuvers.  Additionally, the 
memo produced by the U.S. GNC team to document 
the firing pattern for RS thruster control was 
extensively modified to include all possible RS 
thruster patterns.  The initial efforts were directed at 
the only RS controller logic on-orbit, which was the 
minimum delay logic.  The analysis processes 
continued to transform as the pulse train logic was 
introduced. 
 
 
STRUCTURAL RISK MITIGATION: THE 
PULSE TRAIN  
 
GROWTH OF RISK AWARENESS 
Although Day 174 was the first time that a 
potential structural overload issue due to thruster 
firings was demonstrated during an on-orbit event, 
concerns over the structural risks and confusion over 
the nature of potential thruster firings were not new.   
Before Day 174, it was known that the RS thruster 
control architecture had no limit on pulse width and 
no limit on repeated firings and that worst case 
thruster firings could exceed hardware capability.  
L&D was aware that ISS primary structure risk existed 
prior to GMT 174, but believed it to be very low 
based on multidisciplinary discussions.   
Loads issues regarding the effects of ISS thruster 
attitude control on the U.S. solar arrays had received 
significant attention.  In January 2010, the U.S. L&D 
team raised concerns regarding thruster plume 
impingement on the U.S. solar arrays during RS 
control.  The team determined that in certain 
scenarios the solar array pre-flight load limits could 
be exceeded with just a few thruster firings.  The 
concerns led the ISS Program to disable the 
capability to auto handover to RS thrusters 
whenever the U.S. Solar Arrays were in auto track.    
While this helped to mitigate the potentially 
catastrophic loads on the U.S. Solar Arrays, it also 
impacted existing operational procedures.   The 
constraint did not mitigate the risk of thrusters 
resonating the primary structure. 
Throughout 2010 and 2011, L&D worked to kick 
start a focused effort to constrain RS control system 
induced loads on the structure.  The team performed 
several studies to determine the pulse widths and 
structural frequencies that should be avoided.  The 
single pulse length limits provided to GNC by L&D in 
March of 2010 are shown in Figure 25.  The limited 
pulse durations in the last column are needed in 
order to stay below structural limits.  Figure 26 
shows the frequency sensitivity of two 
representative ISS configurations provided to GNC by 
L&D in August of 2010. 
It was believed that modification of the RS 
thruster firing patterns would reduce structural risk 
and increase the lifetime of ISS structure.  Although 
the importance of balancing these structural 
concerns with sufficient GNC control authority was 
the topic of much discussion, the effort was not 
deemed a high enough priority to make major 
changes prior to Day 174.    
 
 
Figure 25 – Single Pulse Length Constraints (March 
2010 data) 
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Figure 26 – Frequency Sensitivity of ISS Structure to 
Thruster Firings (August 2010 data) 
 
 
EVALUATION OF STRUCTURAL RISK MITIGATION 
OPTIONS 
The nature of the Day 174 event demonstrated 
that the ISS was at risk for loads even higher than the 
loads induced on that day.  There were no adequate 
safe guards in the controller software that would 
prevent thrusters from firing at ISS frequencies, 
whether the firings were in response to flex or due 
to other disturbances, like gravity gradients.  In order 
to reduce the risk that future thruster firings would 
not cause excessive loads on the ISS, several paths 
were pursued. Ultimately a modification to the RS 
software was implemented.  Before that path was 
selected, teams evaluated several other options.   
One option was to use the U.S. rate sensor 
located on the S0 truss instead of the RS rate sensor 
located on the SM.  Since the U.S. sensor is much 
closer to the center of mass, it is less susceptible to 
dynamic motion and structural flex. 
 
 
Figure 27 – U.S. and RS Filtered Rate Sensor Output 
during Day 174 Maneuver  
 
Notice that the U.S. rate sensor data shown in 
Figure 27 is less noisy for the Day 174 maneuver in 
yaw, yet noisier in pitch, than the RS rate sensor 
data.  Use of the S0 rate sensor would reduce firings 
in response to flex, but would not address undesired 
firings in response to other disturbances.  In the end, 
analysis did not show a consistent overall loads 
reduction, so this option was not pursued. 
  Another option was to modify the notch filter in 
the RS software to better notch out structural 
frequencies.  The existing adaptive filter was 
designed to seek and filter out suspected structural 
modes, which would guard against thrusters firing in 
response to structural flex.  L&D identified fixed 
target frequencies for a proposed fixed notch filter.  
However, once again, the analysis showed no 
dependable overall loads reduction with the 
modified filter, so this option was not pursued. 
A third option was to continue using the existing 
controller logic, but use longer minimum delay times 
between thruster firings.  The RS thruster control 
was using a 3 second delay in roll and a 1 second 
delay in pitch and yaw for all maneuvers.  
Unfortunately, analysis showed that while RS 
thruster control could avoid first multiple of 
structural modes by changing the minimum delay 
times, it could just as easily resonate with second or 
third multiples of modes. Figure 28 illustrates the 
loads sensitivity for one thruster configuration at 
two sets of expected duty cycle percentages.  The 
U.S. GNC team wanted to keep the delay times below 
30 seconds in order to maintain sufficient 
controllability, while the L&D team wanted to raise 
the delay times beyond 30 seconds to reduce the 
structural loads.   
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Figure 28 – Loads Evaluation of Controllable Minimum 
Delay Time Regime 
In the end, it was decided that a change in the 
minimum delay time would not reduce the high 
loads risk enough while still maintaining sufficient 
controllability.  Efforts were redirected to the design 
of a new controller logic. 
 
 
MODIFICATION TO RS SOFTWARE LOGIC 
Eventually, the U.S. and RS teams decided jointly 
that the best option was to modify the RS software 
to break up the thruster firings. U.S. and RS GNC 
engineers, in conjunction with L&D team engineers, 
developed a concept to break up the thruster firings 
into what was named a Pulse Train.  The architecture 
is defined by up to 24 periods, with each period 
having a firing window.  There are flags to allow or 
inhibit bi-polar firings and allow or inhibit skipped 
windows, as well as an exclusion zone where firings 
are not allowed.   
The original joint agreement on the baseline 
architecture occurred in December of 2011 for the 
SM 8.05 software.   
The SM 8.05 version of the Pulse Train was 
implemented on-orbit in December of 2012. The 
rules of the pulse train are outlined in Figure 29.  The 
SM 8.07 version, which was implemented in 
December of 2013, added the two flags currently on-
orbit.     
 
 
Figure 29 –Description of Pulse Train Architecture 
 
The Pulse Train selected for use on ISS with SM 
8.07, called “ptc02”, is represented in Figure 30.  It is 
still in use on-orbit as of the writing of this paper.  SM 
thrusters are used for pitch and yaw.  Either the nadir 
Progress or the SM thrusters are used for roll. 
 
 
Figure 30 – Visualization of the ISS Pulse Train 
 
The total duration of the ptc02 pulse train is 3.0 
seconds with duty cycles of 73% roll, 20% pitch, and 
33% yaw.  The times of the periods and windows, in 
seconds, is as follows: 
 
 
The exclusion zone is defined such that if a 
subsequent pulse train does not start within 2 
seconds, then it is not allowed to start until 16 
seconds have elapsed since the end of the previous 
pulse train.  The primary purpose of the exclusion 
zone is to avoid large amplitude resonance with the 
first ISS global mode.     
Due to the number of possible thruster firing 
sequences and number of ISS configurations, it is 
difficult to determine the theoretical maximum loads 
for a given controller.  Efforts to calculate these 
values suggest that, with the widely used thruster 
configuration of Progress Roll SM PY, the theoretical 
maximum loads using the minimum delay time could 
be more than 4 times pre-flight design limit loads.  
With the ptc02 pulse train, the theoretical maximum 
is much lower at approximately 1.4 times pre-flight 
design limit loads.  The 3-sigma loads for ptc02 were 
determined during the pre-flight verification analysis 
to be well within ISS hardware capability. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The Day 174 event successfully alerted the 
community to a structural risk posture that was 
higher than previously believed.  Although it is 
believed that the Day 174 thruster firings were 
largely in response to structural flex, the exact cause 
of the firings did not dictate the need for a new RS 
controller on ISS.  Rather the event revealed that the 
control system could, and did, fire in a way that 
caused loads higher than those predicted in 
preflight, regardless of the driver.  Furthermore, it 
was realized that the ISS had been flying at risk of 
catastrophic structural loads caused by thruster 
firings, and those loads had the potential to be much 
higher than those experienced on Day 174. The 
existing minimum delay controller logic could not 
prevent such firings.   
The multi-disciplinary investigation and issue 
resolution resulted in a significantly reduced 
structural risk posture for ISS via the implementation 
of the Pulse Train logic.  It resulted in a more robust 
pre-flight analysis procedure as well.   
The fidelity of the investigation and conclusions 
were made possible due to the availability of on-
orbit accelerometer data in the pressurized 
elements.  Without that data, the accuracy of the 
model and the reconstruction would have likely been 
greeted with more skepticism.  As has been the case 
with dozens of other structural health events, the 
existence of actual on-orbit accelerometer and rate 
data proved invaluable.  
The Day 174 event demonstrated the importance 
of continuous integration and communication.  This 
includes rigorous definition of terminology and an 
awareness and acceptance of multiple drivers.  In 
this case, it was discovered that the concept of 
Controller Structure Interaction was defined 
differently by different disciplines, teams, and 
individuals.  Also, the cause of the firings was due to 
both rigid body disturbances and structural flex.  At 
times, the debates regarding the cause of the Day 
174 event gave the appearance that it must be one 
or the other, when it was both.  How much each 
contributed cannot be determined precisely. 
The high level of respect and cooperation among 
the international teams during the pulse train design 
discussions and implementation is a testament to 
the importance and success of the ISS Program itself.  
The teams came together with a common goal and a 
focus on the issue, willing and eager to contribute to 
the best programmatic and technical solution. The 
ISS Program continues to demonstrate the 
importance and benefits of working together 
internationally.   
 
